

CHARTER FOR THE DCI SECURITY COMMITTEE'S
WORKING GROUP ON UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES

A. Designation

The official designation of this group is the Working Group on Unauthorized Disclosures, hereinafter referred to as the "WGUD."

B. Objectives and Scope

The WGUD will serve as an advisory body to the DCI Security Committee (SECOM). The Office of the Executive Secretary of the SECOM will serve as the office of record for reports and investigative summaries from WGUD members.

The WGUD will address itself to the problem of intelligence sources and methods being jeopardized by unauthorized disclosures of classified information in the public media.

After coordination with the Chairman, Security Committee, the WGUD shall call upon member departments and agencies, as appropriate, to investigate, or have investigated, within their department or agency any unauthorized disclosure of intelligence information, or intelligence sources and methods; and to report the results of these investigations to the DCI, through the SECOM, together with (a) an assessment of the impact on the US intelligence process and any foreseeable implications to national security or relations with foreign countries as a result of the unauthorized disclosure, (b) corrective measures taken or needed within departments and agencies involved in order to preclude to the extent possible such disclosures in the future or to minimize the adverse effects of the case at hand, and (c) recommendation concerning any appropriate additional actions.

C. Composition

The WGUD will be made up of personnel of departments and agencies represented on the DCI Security Committee. The Chairman, WGUD, will be appointed by the Chairman, DCI Security Committee.

D. Duties

The duties of the WGUD are to recommend to the SECOM procedures to cope with the problems of unauthorized disclosures in the public media. The WGUD will:

1. Review reports of unauthorized disclosures and examine the damage to intelligence sources and methods which result from unauthorized disclosures of classified information, to include the cost to intelligence collection programs and the impact on national planning.
2. Formulate recommendations as appropriate to preclude future unauthorized disclosures to the maximum extent possible.
3. Prepare quarterly reports for the Security Committee. Reports on significant compromises will be made as required.

E. Reporting Procedures

Any WGUD member discovering a possible unauthorized disclosure of classified information which may adversely affect intelligence sources and methods, or having same reported to him will call the Executive Secretary, SECOM, utilizing the secure phone and transmit the following information:

1. Identification of vehicle carrying the suspected compromise: newspaper, periodical, radio, TV, etc.
2. Date, title, author/reporter of information concerned.
3. Classification of information compromised.
4. If known, the agency having cognizance over information concerned (CIA, DIA, State, etc.).

5. Whether agency/department concerned intends to investigate or if the Attorney General will be requested to authorize investigative actions by the FBI. (If a request is to be made to the Attorney General, a decision to authorize investigation will be expedited by the inclusion of answers to the questions in attachment. With respect to question seven, a preliminary determination should be made, if possible, as to the declassifiability of the information for prosecutive purposes.).

6. Whether there has been an official release of the information concerned.

7. Initial estimate as to whether there is damage to intelligence sources and methods.

Interim Reports will be prepared on the more significant compromises as necessary but at least weekly (may be done telephonically) until the particular inquiry is completed.

Final Report


Forward results of investigation to Executive Secretary, SECOM, which will be the central office of record of unauthorized disclosures. The final report should include the following:

1. Extent of investigation within the reporting activity.
2. Damage assessment.
3. Whether the unauthorized disclosure concerned can be traced to a "system" or "people" problem.
4. If the "leaker" has been identified.
5. Comments or recommendations to preclude, to the extent possible, recurrence. Cost to intelligence sources and methods of the disclosure, if it can be determined. Whether operational or contingency plans must be changed as a result of the unauthorized disclosure.

F. Meetings

The Working Group on Unauthorized Disclosures will meet at the call of the Chairman, WGUD, or upon request of any member agency or department.

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Chairman, DCI Security Committee

Attachment

ATTACHMENT to
WGUD Charter

Standard Questions for Investigation of Unauthorized Disclosures

Set forth below are eleven questions, the answers to which are required by the Attorney General prior to a decision being made as to whether the Federal Bureau of Investigation should be requested to conduct an investigation of an unauthorized disclosure of intelligence information or intelligence sources and methods.

1. Date and identity of the article or release disclosing the classified information.
2. Specific statements which are classified and whether the data was properly classified.
3. Whether the classified data disclosed is accurate.
4. Whether the data came from a specific document and, if so, the origin of the document and the name of the individual responsible for the security of the classified data disclosed.
5. The extent of official dissemination of the data.
6. Whether the data has been the subject of prior official releases.
7. Whether prior clearance for publication or release of the information was sought from proper authorities.
8. Whether the material or portions thereof or enough background data has been published officially or in the press to make an educated speculation on the matter possible.
9. Whether the data can be declassified for the purpose of prosecution and, if so, the name of the person competent to testify concerning the classification.
10. Whether declassification had been decided upon prior to the publication or release of the data.
11. What effect the disclosure of the classified data could have on the national defense.